## Why

Access and refresh tokens are issued with Passport's default lifetime of one year, because the application never calls `Passport::tokensExpireIn()`. Users notice that returning to the site after a long absence keeps them signed in, and have raised this as a concern for a system holding payroll and personal data. The one-year lifetime was never a decision — it is a default nobody set.

Two related defects sit in the same code path. There is no logout endpoint, so signing out leaves the token alive. And `Account::revokeTokens()` only revokes rows in `oauth_access_tokens`, while refresh tokens are validated against `oauth_refresh_tokens` independently — so an account whose password was reset, or whose access was revoked, can still exchange its refresh token for a fresh access token for up to a year.

## What Changes

- **BREAKING** Access tokens expire after 30 minutes instead of one year. Clients must refresh.
- Refresh tokens expire after 3 days of disuse. Because every refresh issues a new refresh token with a new expiry, this acts as an idle timeout: a session stays alive while it is used and ends after 3 days of silence.
- A logout endpoint revokes the caller's access token and its refresh token.
- `Account::revokeTokens()` also revokes the matching refresh tokens, closing the hole where a revoked account could refresh its way back in.
- Authentication failures return distinct error codes so a client can tell "try refreshing" from "send the user to the login screen".
- All tokens issued before this change are revoked on deploy, so no one keeps a one-year token.

No new tables and no new columns. The change is configuration, one endpoint, a bug fix and an error contract.

## Capabilities

### New Capabilities
- `auth-token-lifetime`: how long access and refresh tokens live, how refresh-token rotation produces an idle timeout, and the error codes returned when a token or a session has expired.
- `auth-token-revocation`: logout, and the account events that revoke tokens — covering refresh tokens, not only access tokens.

### Modified Capabilities
<!-- None. No existing spec in openspec/specs/ covers authentication. -->

## Impact

- **Config**: `AuthServiceProvider::boot()` gains the Passport lifetime calls; the values live in config.
- **API**: `POST /api/v1/login` returns new error codes; new `POST /api/v1/logout`. Every authenticated endpoint can now return `token_expired`.
- **Code**: `app/Providers/AuthServiceProvider.php`, `app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/Guest/AuthController.php`, `app/Http/Middleware/Authenticate.php`, `app/Models/Account.php` (`revokeTokens`, `revokeTokensByAccountIds`), `routes/v1/api.php`.
- **Database**: no schema change. Existing rows in `oauth_access_tokens` and `oauth_refresh_tokens` are revoked at deploy.
- **Clients**: the web front end must implement silent refresh and handle the new error codes. The front end is being updated in parallel, so no backward-compatibility shim is needed.

## Out of Scope

Deliberately excluded, each viable as its own change later:

- **Absolute timeout** — capping a session at N days regardless of activity. It would require carrying a login timestamp across refresh-token rotation, which means a schema change, a Passport repository override and a new middleware. All of this change's complexity would come from that one feature, and the problem being solved here does not need it.
- **Session and device listing** — letting a user see and revoke their own active sessions.
- **Refresh-token reuse detection** — treating a replayed refresh token as a compromised session.
- **Login rate limiting** — a separate concern from session lifetime.
- **Step-up authentication** for sensitive endpoints.
- **Scheduled pruning** of expired token rows (`passport:purge`).
